Interview with Mark Feygin. Putin's children, the Patrushevs' plans for the throne and Moscow's "peace proposals"

How many Russians must die for a reaction in the Russian Federation

I want to talk to you about the mobilization in Russia, which has not stopped. To this day, the probability of dying in a war in Ukraine is 30-40 times higher for residents of Buryatia than for Muscovites. What should the Russian army lose to feel it in Russia?

Indeed, the capitals, large cities, and population mobilization are not affected. Why? Because, firstly, the motivation is different. 200 thousand rubles. It is one thing for Buryatia and another for a Muscovite, where the average standard of living and salary is undoubtedly higher.

Therefore, it will be much more challenging to work with this electorate, and this environment of ordinary people, and it may get more indignant.

Sooner or later, these people will also be involved because if the war continues, it is impossible to avoid it, especially for such losses. To apply Muscovites in this so-called "military operation", they are technically more educated than a provincial Buryat or some other person from the national autonomy but who work in some industries in areas that interest the army.

This is a nature that is decreasing because resettlers are now testifying that people with a speciality and people with an education are leaving Russia. According to various estimates, it is about hundreds and thousands, if not even a few million. It is easier to work with Buryats and Tuvans and send them from some provinces.

What level of losses can be felt and cause some reaction from Russian society in response? And he was alone.

What have we been pushing back against all the time? From the war in Chechnya, from 3.5-4 thousand dead conscripts. The war in Afghanistan — about 15,000-16,000 dead, who performed the so-called international duty from a limited contingent in Afghanistan. You see, these are comparative numbers. Compared to what is happening now in Ukraine, they are very modest.

I am not talking about the conflict in Georgia. It's all very modest, very modest. Now, the bill runs into many tens of thousands, if not hundreds. Even if it is not 340,000, as the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine declares, if there are 200,000, is that not enough? Compared to the losses in Afghanistan in 10 years, in two wars in Chechnya?

Undoubtedly, this is an unprecedented, gigantic Eastern European war.

I agree; it's a phenomenon. No one expected this. General Zaluzhnyi says in his article that we did not [know that the Russians would fight for such losses]. That is why today, we have to state that we do not see the level of casualties that will lead to resentment or reaction from society; we do not know what it will be. Do we need a million or how much, 500 thousand? I do not know.

And you know what else? The most challenging thing is a positional war when you stand as if on the demarcation line, where one person dies every day. At the moment, the peak fighting is going on in Avdiivka, where tens of thousands, if not thousands, are dying. And what is it? Other people would say what a meat grinder is, you are not a normal people at all. What are you doing? But where is it? Mothers, five pieces that came out with posters and wives. Not seriously. That's why I don't see it yet.

Patrushev's family and Putin's daughters: who to expect when in power in the Russian Federation

I want to talk to you about political leadership. About Patrushev. It has become more active now, especially after another "death of Putin". But who, apart from him, has political weight?

It would be more correct to say the family of Patrushev because there is not so much Patrushev himself, but his son Dima [Dmitriy - Ed.], who is 43 years old. He is the Minister of Agriculture and a candidate for the post of Prime Minister, by the way, after the elections.

Under this, there are severe reasons that Mishustin [Prime Minister of the Russian Federation — ed.] can be changed. Why? It is logic. It should be some always-dependent figure that should not sit long. A person gets used to a place and believes he is the second person in the state. According to the Constitution, this hierarchy assumes the prime minister's status.

Patrushev headed the FSB, and he is now the secretary of the Security Council, but clearly, his capabilities go far beyond the borders of the Security Council.

But, of course, the Patrushev family has ambitions unlike others. Others may have some idea of what is beautiful within this system but not claim the role of the first official in any, even remote perspective.

This does not mean there is a conflict with Putin on this matter. No, that's not what it's about.

Putin himself has relatives. These are his daughters, Katerina Tikhonova and Maria Vorontsova. I think we will see them in the government soon. We will see them in power as "young, promising, state managers."

Just after March, after the election?

There is a chance, yes. It is necessary to act already because it is the eighth decade of this and that [Putin and Patrushev — Ed.], and it doesn't matter whether Patrushev is the son or daughter of Putin or some other descendants of the same.

But they should be saturated with background, and they should be civil servants, not golden youth who had fun with dubious pleasures.

Do they need to create the illusion that something is changing?

You cannot create it artificially because the fact that he called his daughters by other names does not mean that everyone does not understand that they are his children. It is so. Therefore, there is internal competition. And myself

So Patrushev's publicity is sanctioned. That is, Putin is not against this publicity.

The same as the fool whom [Dmitriy] Medvedev is beating around the bush. He also doesn't just write these posts and everything else. They allowed him, and they said, well, you're doing well, we'll start social networks, and you're such an active guy here, work. Therefore, everyone has a role.

[Nikolai] Patrushev has the role of such a solid face, a fighter against the West, motivated for eternal confrontation. That's why his family's chances are significant, I would say. But everything will depend on Putin. It cannot be ruled out that Putin will one day get rid of them all. We saw that. [Yevgeniy] Prigozhin was generally a cook, and he carried food.

How many times could he poison Putin by giving him heavy metals in asparagus? And he didn't do it, and he missed a unique chance. Therefore, I would not say that everything is forever. From external activity and manifestations, one must understand that within this environment, there is no less distrust and hatred than among the Tudors.

The only condition for the elimination of Putin

What should the situation be in Russia so that the special services can eliminate Putin? Under what options is this possible?

Russia's military defeat. To blame all this on him, to remove responsibility. Cleaning up Putin makes sense only for one thing: to remove guilt.

Everything else is fine with them. If they win, why do it? Defeat loves fools. Therefore, if there is a loss, it should be related not to the entire system, not to all these people, from his environment, but to himself. It's not us, and it's all him.

And it's easier to clean it up and hang it on him, to say: "Well, what are you accusing us of? He made all the decisions. He's a usurper. What are we? We tried, we wanted."

Even Patrushev will start shouting that at the meeting of the Security Council on February 20, 2022, he said that it is necessary to wait for the recognition of the so-called "DPR", "LPR", etc. Everyone will find an excuse, and it's easiest to blame someone who can't say anything.

This threat to the Kremlin after June 24 was genuine. It's just that the transgressor of the convention [Prygozhin] violated this unspoken boundary beyond which he must do nothing. He paid for it. He was simply taken and killed on August 20 by shooting down his plane.

In everything else, we can state that power is fragile when there is internal conflict. And when the power element is involved in this conflict. You can rally until you're blue in the face. But when a convoy of several thousand people moves, such anabiosis already occurs, and what to do? And it seems that there is no one, nothing to do. Yes, that doesn't mean power can be transferred, but chaos can ensue.

Therefore, the weakening and destabilization of the management system within the Russian government is the most essential element of victory for Ukraine.

The LFR is the future free armed forces of Russia

I want to discuss Russia's armed opposition. I mean the Legion "Freedom of Russia" (LFR). Our team shot a documentary about them — "The Collapse of the Dictatorship of the Word". I know that you met with the legionnaires. What can you say after your visit?

I met with the Legion "Freedom of Russia" twice: when I was in May, I had a trip to Donbas, I was in Chasiv Yar, and so on.

This time, I was along the entire front line. I was already accompanied by the "Freedom of Russia" Legion servicemen. That is, they provided security, and I met with them both then as cadets and now as well as with the personnel. Such, one might say, was a semi-lecture before them.

We discussed, asked questions, exchanged opinions, etc. This, as well as with the leadership of the RVC [Russian Volunteer Corps — Ed.], I also met with the commanders from the operational leadership.

This is truly a prototype of the future armed forces, the free armed forces of Russia.

These are courageous, well-prepared, seriously motivated, and ideologically motivated. They were not forced to go for 200,000 rubles, but he did so voluntarily.

It is also essential to say that no one was forced. People ask to go there.

Putin is afraid of any military opposition

And how much is Putin afraid of them? Siberian Battalion, LFR, Russian Volunteer Corps. How scared is he now of these statements that they can reach Moscow?

He is afraid of this ideology in general. He is scared of any military opposition because it is no joke.

They are used to fighting with bespectacled people, hipsters, aunts, older women, etc. Do you understand? And here you have people with machine guns. You go and disperse them, like at a rally. Therefore, there are fears and apprehensions. Another thing is that in the current situation, let's say, they are strengthening the borders a lot—Belgorod region after all these raids and so on.

That is, translated connections. Previously, the border was empty, but now there is evidence that they fear that such a raid is possible and will go to Moscow, not to Moscow, but somewhere.

If there are more [armed Russians], these fears will increase. If they remain few, then Moscow and the Kremlin probably have time.

They are also trying to get in there, infiltrate them, and launch criminal cases against relatives. There is much operative work regarding these connections: Russian citizens who participated there left Russia and fled from Russia.

So there is fear because, I repeat, they are not equal to all these peaceful, liberal and quasi-liberal Moscow oppositionists, most of whom left, but the part that remained does not pose a threat to the regime.

Where does Russia get the money for the war

I want to talk about Russia's budget for 2024. Military spending should increase by almost 70% compared to 2023. Where is the money if sanctions are constantly imposed on Russia?

Still, we must state that these sanctions were incomplete and insufficient to undermine Russia's economic potential.

It is said that since the beginning of the war, half a trillion dollars have been received from the hydrocarbon industry. Half a trillion dollars and $142 billion in direct war spending, although they say much more. However, the money is there. There is income to the budget.

What is being done as restrictions on the part of the West regarding Moscow is not enough. Why does the war continue, even with increasing potential?

The fact is that Moscow, the Kremlin, does not have the reflex to reduce the budget articles for education, medicine, social sphere, health care, or anything else and transfer them to the war.

They are not sorry. The people are not dissatisfied. Everyone is satisfied.

Since there are no threats, they are pleased they can dispose of the money so freely, reducing the population to poverty in three decades.

Now, you can manage them by handing out 200,000 mobilized for participation in the so-called "special military operation". This is a very comfortable position. The money is not that big considering the hydrocarbon situation [Feygim implies Russian oil and gas trade income — Ed.] and how much the budget receives.

So today, Russia has the resources and the necessary degree of financial stabilization to continue the war at the level of intensity it deems necessary.

Maidan-3 and the fight against IPSO

Russia constantly uses any leverage to denigrate Zelensky. From the latter, this is a campaign by the Russian special services to destabilize Ukrainian society, Maidan-3. Putin has nothing more to show, so are they making up different stories? Is there another reason?

Within Ukraine, I believe there is no resource for any Maidan. It is possible to increase the dissatisfaction that can and does exist in Ukrainian society on various issues, but there are few chances.

[Oleksii] Danilov [NSDC Secretary —- Ed.] discusses sleeper agents. During the war, any sleeper agent discovered would end up in prison at best.

This topic is currently being pedalled between Zaluzhnyi and Zelenskyy. There is a lot of artificiality here. You see, everyone is working on the same task. Some are more efficient, and some are less efficient, but what to do? And so I assume that Moscow, of course, is trying to intensify all these conflicts, to increase them, but they only have informational tools.

There are no such [pro-Russian] leaders of public opinion or mass media within Ukraine or any structures, churches, public organizations, parties, or anything like that.

All Moscow infrastructure in Ukraine has been destroyed. There are some individual people, but they do not make the weather, and they cannot influence it. Regarding information, Moscow continues PsyOp or not, but continues its influence, sometimes successfully, sometimes less successfully.

It is necessary to block this IPSO and not try to convince anyone. It is essential to prohibit such other things. I don't see any other toolkit under the conditions of war.

If factors threaten the country's protection and unity — swinging the topic of elections or something else — you have to act.

The legislation provides for a single way of carrying out these tasks, and that's it. Martial law is martial law.

Everyone understands that if all this is allowed to grow, it will be impossible to hold the front. People will be in the trenches saying, listen, what are they doing there? We are dying here, and they are figuring out relationships there.

What negotiations does Russia want with Ukraine

And if the topic of peace negotiations with Russia is discussed? Who benefits from this? Because now we see how very carefully, perhaps, they are pushing for it. Putin stated that he did not refuse peace talks, but at the same time, we do not see any direct conditions.

In Russia, both Putin and his entourage repeat the issue of negotiation readiness in different ways. They want negotiations as capitulation.

What is negotiation? This is primarily a compromise in the diplomatic sense. Negotiation is always a compromise. Mutual compromise.

Where is Moscow's compromise? You, he says, give us the territory, demilitarize, send back all the weapons that were given to you, recognize Russian as the second state language, amnesty for everyone, something else, don't dance on the square for us. This is what the position looks like.

And what [Russia] in return? And we, he says, will not go to Kyiv. What does Moscow offer instead? Let me directly list what Moscow is offering in return. Moscow is provided to leave the occupied territory. It says, “No, these are geopolitical realities, and we will not leave anything”.

Vog Rasmussen's plan has been voiced many times: 80% join NATO and European integration and 20% freeze in a state of occupation. Where did Moscow even once agree to this? I am not saying that the public opinion of Ukraine concurs with this; it does not agree with such an option.

But where did Moscow even express its attitude to such a compromise? No, they say neutral status, no negotiations.

But we understand that if Ukraine suddenly becomes a member of NATO, there will be no more war sooner than if it assumes a neutral status.

Therefore, Ukraine cannot agree to withdraw from NATO because it is the only severe guarantor. After all, other NATO countries have not been subjected to aggression by Moscow.

As a capitulation, this is unacceptable for anyone. There is no reason for her. Moscow says we will not go to Kyiv, but have you reached Kyiv? We saw how it ended.

The topic of negotiations is shaking, but it is precisely the capitulation option, not the compromise option. Therefore, it is unacceptable for Ukraine and is unlikely to be implemented now.

Why should Ukraine accept as if it lost the war? She did not lose it. Yes, this situation of military balance is sad and depressing, but it is not a defeat.

How the Russian Federation limits the return of stolen Ukrainian children

Recently, Russia has maximally restricted the entry of Ukrainians from third countries into its territory. This makes it challenging to return our abducted children from the temporarily occupied territories. Is this what Putin wanted when he limited this entry as much as possible?

I think this is one of the reasons because the International Criminal Court accuses him of war crimes against children under Article 8 of the Rome Statute. And the warrant was issued precisely on this topic, where he confessed. He told all this together with [Maria] Lvova-Bielova.

These restrictions are in place for this and other topics in particular. They are trying to filter Ukrainians entering Russia, believing that each of them is an SSU or DIU agent, and they are creating new barriers.

They cannot introduce visas, like Ukraine, because they occupied the territory of Ukraine. How will a person who does not accept Russian citizenship, living in the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia or Kherson regions, drive? Although formally, they gave them all the rights practically as a citizen.

That is why they are still imposing restrictions from the outside. But again, I emphasize that all this is for a practical purpose, and the goals of moving children and so on are all being pursued.

According to various estimates, up to 5 million Ukrainian citizens are in Russia. I don't know if this is a correct estimate or not. This is everyone, including people from the occupied territories. Even if it is 1 million, it is a gigantic number, and these people must be absorbed somehow; they must somehow be made Russian in Russia.

So, they want to segregate. There are Ukrainians who become Russians from the occupied territories. And some come somehow. They still have relatives. These people are less reliable in their perception, probably because if they come, it means with some purpose. Because they, as Ukrainians from the occupied territory, cannot get citizenship automatically, and these people cannot, there is a particular order for them. So, in general, there are security goals in here somewhere.

Does Ukraine have agreements with Belarus?

If we continue the subject of the deportation of children, it is a confirmed fact that the dictator of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, is also involved in this. Has his role in helping Putin in the war faded or ended altogether?

Of course, this is a country occupied by Russia. Still, Lukashenko retains some imaginary power, which does not extend to the issue of the war with Ukraine but can partially contribute to the blocking of some things. I expressed my opinion.

Lukashenko himself is not very happy to turn out to be a war criminal in this isolation and in general with an unknown and unclear perspective. Therefore, there is probably some room for compromise.

In general, I would say that Lukashenko is very focused on himself, not on the great goals of the war, Belarusian statehood, or something else like that.

It focuses on ensuring security for yourself, your children, your assets, etc. The rest has an official function. It will be necessary to do one thing to ensure the main task he will do it. If it is required for his safety not to participate in the war, he will announce non-participation.

This is now the stage when he does not go around with memes, but they are preparing an attack on us, and when it is better to be silent, he is quiet. There are no other reasons for this. Lukashenko has been sitting for 35 years. What's the difference between a year, more or less? His entire life was spent in this presidential palace.

Maybe he's alone and doesn't want to. But did anyone ask him? Putin has absolute control over Belarus, starting with finances and possibly ousting Lukashenko from power altogether, if necessary. Therefore, he also appreciates it.

Maybe he didn't want to get involved in the war. But this does not remove his responsibility. It is very convenient to say: "Oh, I couldn't do anything. Rockets were flying from my territory, tanks were entering, and Ukrainians were being killed. And what could I do? What happened to me, to lie under the [tank] tracks?”

No, my friend. No, it is not. Therefore, I believe he should not look for excuses; he should be used situationally.

And this is what the Ukrainian authorities do, understanding the price. [She thinks]: "Well, well, now he is not directly involved in the war with the troops of Belarus, thank God."

Perhaps, in part, this condition: not to cooperate with Tsykhanouskaya and neither to annoy or involve Lukashenko. This is also one of those compromises. But again, I repeat, everything can change.

Lukashenko does one thing, then another. By the way, I was convinced they would involve him in the war. At the beginning of the war, I was confident he would not sit out. Sooner or later, they would force him because they had all the leverage. But the war did not go that way, and he now has a strong motivation: "You yourselves cannot take Kyiv in three days."

He has his arguments, which he can present to Putin. It is not known how the Belarusian military will behave. They will take and go over to the Ukraine side. And why should they fight with Ukraine? For what? Why? Why? There are many arguments with which he can manoeuvre in communication with Putin.

Russia wants to build a tunnel in Crimea

Russia and China plan to build an underground tunnel, a backup for the Crimean bridge. How accurate is this implementation, and what is happening between Russia and China?

I think no single double or one of these underground tunnels will be made. In case of war, this is impossible. Any shell or missile can sink it, and why all these risks?

There is probably some idea, some project, but I don't think that in the war conditions, China will undertake to implement it, spend money, or, in the end, Russia will even spend money. Because what is the guarantee that all this will hold? But none.

It seems to me that this is such a stupid project. Without war, this tunnel is unnecessary because there is a bridge, which is dangerous in war conditions.

As for China and Moscow, they remain as before. Moscow seeks vassalage from China. And what are the options? It trades through China, and it accesses global markets through China. It seeks military support from China.

And China is manoeuvring. China does not want to communicate with Moscow. It does not want to be responsible for what Moscow is doing. We see it, too. Otherwise, why was [Xi Jinping] visiting San Francisco and talking to Biden this way? Remove responsibility; yes, solve your questions. They are looking for an opportunity to take over Taiwan and integrate it back into mainland China.

But China will stick to this independent position. Otherwise, it would have long ago supported Moscow more decisively. China benefits from destabilization because in conditions of destabilization, it can take over Taiwan, and it will get nothing for it. But Moscow cannot achieve this. Look, they started the conflict in the Middle East. How much did they achieve there? Not particularly.

And here is Tajikistan. Recently, Putin presented the President of Tajikistan with the Order "For Merit to the Motherland". Why was it all?

And this is all ritualistic. All of Central Asia is already under Chinese control. These relations with Moscow are purely based on inertia. When Moscow was still the only geopolitical hegemon in the space of the former USSR, a reorientation had already occurred.

After Xi Jinping's state visit to Russia on March 22, all the leaders of the Central Asian countries came to Beijing in just a few months, as they came as a team and made a knicks, assured of their loyalty. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, etc., perfectly understand where power, money, and the absence of problems lie.

China, unlike Moscow, is not an exile in this system. Despite all the contradictions with the West, it is not under sanctions or at war with anyone. And who is China at war with? No war. There is a confrontation with India, but it is a different kind of confrontation; border, all these upheavals, they do not play a role.

China has an entirely separate program, and so on.

Does the West have a plan for what to do with Russia after its defeat

To what extent does the world now understand what to do with Russia after the end of the war, after the victory of Ukraine? Is there any plan as to how ready they are?

We see that they do not want the complete disintegration of Russia, the collapse, the destruction of power as an institution in Russia, even one that is unacceptable both in terms of personalities and methods.

But it is better than Prigozhin. They said so. They were happy that Prigozhin's coup did not succeed and Russia did not descend into chaos and further disintegration. Therefore, they probably see some change in the current situation without Putin. Still, with the preservation of the controllability of the system, something can be agreed upon with it. The West probably sees it that way.

There was a moment when it was brought to the extreme, and it was believed that it could be overcome in one leap, and suddenly Moscow would collapse, and something new and good would appear in its place.

They have returned to the old concept — to keep the status quo as controlled as possible.

But I want to say that the West has often been wrong. They also thought of keeping the USSR and wanted the USSR not to collapse. Perestroika, Gorbachev, everything is fine. But who asks them? History spins according to its laws. Therefore, the chance of maintaining this status quo is slight.