Is Prigozhin's son really leading the Wagner Group's mercenaries now, are they going to fight against Ukraine again, and are the militants training Hamas, Oleksandr “Fortuna”, the chief of staff of the Russian Volunteer Corps, told online.ua.
Is Prigozhin's son really in charge of Wagner Group?
After Prigozhin's death, information emerged that his son led the Wagner Group’s mercenaries in the Russian Guard and resumed their recruitment in Perm.
“Fortuna” reports that it is currently known that representatives of the “Wagner Group” who want to fight can do so through Russia’s National Guard.
Some agreed, some refused. That is, they were simply divided into several such categories. There is a category of people who refused, there is a category of people who have doubts, and there is a category of people who agree. This category was simply divided into two parts: someone went to the Ministry of Defense under a direct contract, the rest were structurally redirected to Russia’s National Guard.
According to the chief of staff of the RVC, this is simply a redistribution of the militant market.
I don't think that Prigozhin's son actually decides anything there. He was simply made the person who is publicly responsible for this, but to what extent does she make decisions, to what extent does she bear actual responsibility, to what extent can she make a difference? I personally doubt it very much.
Are there parallels in the tactics of private military companies in Ukraine and Hamas in Israel
There was information in the mass media that the fighters of the Wagner PMC were preparing Hamas for operations against Israel. “Fortuna” says that there is a certain similarity in tactics globally, but it is difficult to say to what extent this is the influence of the PMC.
If we consider the tactics of the actions of the representatives of the "Wagner" PMC on the territory of Ukraine, at the front, then we are simply talking about the actions of some infantry units with the support of equipment. These are such narrowly specific military accounts, military stories on the front.
If we talk about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the battles in Gaza, then these are urban battles, battles in closed spaces, and tunnels. Here it is difficult to find a trace of the “Wagner Group” school in the actions of Hamas representatives.
There are some commonalities that can be superimposed on it. This is the use of drones, the use of various defenses against UAVs, this is the infiltration of militants across the border. It is clear that the methods and knowledge are derived from the analysis of the war in Ukraine. But, apparently, this is where the similarities end.
