As analysts from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) note, the criminal military-political leadership of the aggressor country of Russia will try to implement several scenarios in response to the offensive of the Ukrainian military in the Kursk region.
Points of attention
- The Russian military-political leadership is expected to implement various scenarios in response to the offensive of the Ukrainian military in the Kursk region.
- Analysts predict that Russia may use a combination of irregular and regular forces to counter Ukrainian troops and potentially regain lost territories in Kurshchyna.
- The speed of the Ukrainian troops' advance and the lack of a coordinated Russian response indicate possible operational surprise along the border with Russia.
- Possible Russian scenarios include the use of conscripts, border guards, operational reserves, and aviation units to counter the Ukrainian offensive.
- The offensive of Ukrainian forces in the Kursk region poses a significant challenge to the interests of Kremlin dictator Putin, threatening Russian stability, security, and geopolitical ambitions.
What is known about probable scenarios of the development of events in the Kursk region
Analysts emphasize that the offensive of the Ukrainian military in the Kursk region, which began with the breakthrough of the border on August 6, continues with further progress, which was confirmed by geolocation data and statements of the Russians as of August 8.
According to information coming from various sources, the Ukrainian military has already managed to advance 35 km deep from the border.
How can the Russian occupiers act in response to the offensive of the Armed Forces in Kurshchyna
The ISW expressed its belief that the Kremlin leadership will try to return the lost territories and stop the further advance of the Ukrainian military.
Analysts emphasize that a significant advance of the Armed Forces would be a powerful blow to Kremlin dictator Vladimir Putin's efforts to consolidate the legacy of Russian stability, security and geopolitical revival.
According to the first scenario , the command of the criminal army of the Russian Federation will use conscripts and units of border guards of the FSB, the Russian Guard and other irregular forces already deployed in the border area.
The second scenario assumes that the command of the occupation army of the Russian Federation will use the Northern group of troops deployed along the Russian-Ukrainian border.
The third scenario assumes that the military command of the aggressor country will decide to transfer operational reserves accumulated for the planned offensive in the summer of 2024, and/or relatively better equipped and more combat-capable advanced units to the Kursk region from the areas of hostilities in Ukraine.
According to the fourth scenario , the command of the Russian occupiers will seek to preserve the forces that are stationed in the Kursk region and will act at the expense of transferring a large number of aviation and strike units.