The agent sent the received information to his Russian curator through an anonymous chat in the messenger.
Points of attention
- A Russian GRU agent collaborated with enemies in Ukraine by transmitting information for potential attacks and adjusting enemy fire.
- The SSU uncovered the agent's criminal activities, which included scouting geolocations of Defense Forces and coordinating attacks on Sumy, resulting in casualties.
- The agent used an anonymous chat to communicate with a GRU staff member, sending videos of potential targets with coordinates and detailed descriptions of objects.
- The SSU detained the Russian agent and documented his crimes, leading to charges under the Criminal Code of Ukraine for treason, with the possibility of life imprisonment and property confiscation.
- Measures were taken to secure locations of the Defense Forces following the exposure of the Russian agent, highlighting the importance of counterintelligence efforts in protecting national security.
The SSU exposed a Russian "mole" in the ranks of the TCC in Volyn
The military counterintelligence of the SBU exposed the Russian agent, documented his crimes and detained him. At the same time, additional measures were taken to secure the locations of the Defense Forces.
According to the investigation, the suspect came to the attention of the occupiers through his relatives in Russia, with whom he maintained contact and shared anti-Ukrainian views.
The investigators of the Security Service informed the agent about the suspicion under part 2 of Art. 111 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (treason committed under martial law).
The perpetrator is in custody. He faces life imprisonment with confiscation of property.
The SBU detained the adjuster of the Russian attack on Sumy on October 22
As noted in the SBU, a 23-year-old resident of Sumy turned out to be the adjuster of enemy fire. It was at his coordinates, according to the investigation, that terrorists attacked the city of Shahedom on October 22, resulting in the death of three people, including a child.
It was established that the agent was in direct contact with a staff member of the GRU. For communication, they used an anonymous chat in the messenger, where the traitor sent videos of potential targets with coordinates and a detailed description of the objects.