According to Western analysts, the criminal army of the Russian Federation could achieve greater success in the war against Ukraine if it followed its own military doctrine.
The Russian army does not follow its military doctrine in the war against Ukraine
According to Scott Boston, an expert on the Russian army at the RAND Corporation Centre, the official manuals of the occupation army of the Russian Federation on the tactics of conducting hostilities contain quite reasonable and reliable points.
Many of the basic elements of this doctrine are sound enough to form the basis of successful operations. But you have to follow it, Boston explains.
In particular, Russian military doctrine provides that during assault operations, units should conduct an offensive with several echelons of infantry units, tanks, and armoured vehicles, cooperating with intelligence, protecting from the flanks, and with the support of engineering units, artillery, and anti-aircraft defence.
Even the width of the front line for the offensive is provided.
However, during the occupying army of the Russian Federation's attempt to capture Kyiv in a flash at the beginning of the criminal invasion, the convoys of vehicles of the criminal army of the Russian Federation simply moved along congested, narrow roads.
They were destroyed in large numbers by Ukrainian artillery, checkpoints and ambushes of the Ukrainian military.
However, even now, the occupying army of the Russian Federation continues to ignore its manuals on conducting hostilities.
Thus, instead of conducting a quick and well-coordinated manoeuvre, the Russian invaders bombard the positions of the Ukrainian military with a massive number of artillery shells and heavy aerial bombs.
All this is combined with numerous so-called "meat assaults".
According to Scott Boston, attacks based on military doctrine can also fail.
However, in his opinion, the Russian occupiers failed precisely because they ignored the instructions from their textbooks on waging war.
How does an analyst assess Russia's strategy in the war against Ukraine
At the same time, the analyst emphasises that the general strategy of the invasion of the occupation army of the Russian Federation into Ukraine is wrong.
In particular, the criminal army of the Russian Federation did not expect such fierce resistance from the Ukrainians.
Because of this, the units of the Russian Federation's occupation army did not have a clear plan of action before the invasion.
The Russian occupiers were not given any tasks other than capturing certain settlements.
The analyst notes that on the eve of the US army's invasion of Iraq, the US military also did not expect strong resistance from the Iraqi army.
However, the US military had a clear plan for the invasion of the country and included, in particular, a variant with fierce Iraqi resistance.
The expert emphasised that military doctrines and training will not significantly impact the military if given the wrong tasks and forced to perform them with the wrong tools.
At the same time, Boston admits that the Russians did some things right. It applies particularly to the tactics of countering the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023 when dense minefields covered the Russians.
