Russian troops will not be able to conduct large-scale offensive operations in the summer in several directions, even if they will send many recruits to the battlefield.
Points of attention
- The new reserves of the Russian army will not act as penetration forces of the first or second echelons.
- Russian offensive operations along the front are characterized by "pulsation", when intensive attacks alternate with less intensive ones to replenish losses.
- The planned Russian reserves of the operational level are not capable of conducting effective large-scale combined attacks.
- Russian forces suffer heavy losses, losing as many soldiers as they send to the battlefield.
A large-scale advance of the Russians deep into Ukraine is currently unlikely
As the American Institute for the Study of War points out, the new reserves of the Russian army will not be able to act as penetration forces of the first or second echelons.
And this, in turn, makes it impossible for the enemy to make significant advances on the battlefield.
Despite the fact that the occupiers used their initiative throughout the front and even set the pace of fighting in Ukraine in recent months, they still faced heavy losses again.
The point is that the enemy loses about as many soldiers as it puts on the battlefield every month.
This balance between Russian losses and newly created forces requires, however, that Russian forces do not significantly intensify offensive operations for an extended period. This balance becomes even narrower if we take into account the losses and the formation of new forces only for Russian personnel, analysts explain.
Russia still lacks soldiers to carry out successful offensives
The American Institute for the Study of War draws attention to the "pulsation" of Russian offensive operations along the front.
First of all, it refers to the fact that the occupiers alternate intensive attacks with lower operational rates to replenish losses.
The availability of new personnel is probably one of several determining factors influencing the decision of Russian troops to alternate intensive offensive operations with less intensive ones, experts believe.
After long-term observations, the ISW team concluded that the planned Russian reserves of the operational and strategic levels would not be able to function as a first- or second-echelon penetration force capable of conducting effective large-scale combined attacks.
